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This can be attributed to the inactive trading environment where the participants with bigger trading scale intentionally or unintentionally manipulate the market to some extent This finding agrees with the extant macroeconomic literature that suggests the increasing maturity of EU ETS 7 , 8.
Stable value realization of emission abatements facilitates the financial management of carbon allowances, which are widely recognized as financial assets 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 that influence a series of energy commodities such as crude oil and natural gas Our final observation was obtained in the comparison of the state-level r—g correlations of the participating states in the carbon market. The majority of the states and firms have similar trading patterns because they profited proportionally to their abatements for trading.
Meanwhile, certain companies with significant allowance gaps affected their countries significantly. For example, in Phase I, the UK had positive trading profit with a negative g , while Germany made the highest profit with a zero abatement for trading. To the best of our knowledge, insufficient attention has been directed at the realization of national carbon abatements through firm-level trading in the scheme possibly owing to limited data availability.
Accordingly, our unique firm-level trading data set fills in this knowledge gap.
A direct implication of this finding for policy makers and administrators is that increased attention should be provided to monitor the transactions of these industrial giants. The abnormal firms may have at least one of the following features: conducting a few transactions and odd trading behaviors, e. These transactions cause these firms to be overrewarded or overpunished.
Hence, active and balanced transactions with directions i. Among all the potential national differences that affect trading, the development of low-carbon technologies varies from one member state to another is worthy of in-depth investigation because of its influence on the majority of the participating firms at the state level. The detailed aggregation procedure of this unique data set is presented in the Supplementary Method: Construction of firm-level trading data set.
This unique data set can be regarded as the complete transaction log of Phases I and II allowances. To the best of our knowledge, no research has constructed firm-level trading data in such comparable detail and so completely. Moreover, the data employed in the extant literature either only cover Phase I 45 , 47 , 48 or fails to link installations to firms 45 , Using the unique microlevel trading data set, we aim to examine the effect of the market incentives that are provided by the cap-and-trade system on carbon abatements.
To avoid the inequality of the data and find some potential non-linear relationships, we employ a quantile regression model to investigate the correlation between firm profits r and quantiles g in EU ETS:. We use 20 quantiles i. All regression results for these quantiles are significant for the carbon trading data of Phases I and II can be found in Fig. The quantile regression results are based on the firm-level dataset. In addition, we employ heat maps to visualize the distributions of r and g in detail.
The differences in the goodness-of-fit values of the different phases can be effectively explained visually via the heat maps Fig. The process and outcomes of robustness check is given in the Supplementary Method: Robustness check. Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article. The data sets generated during or analyzed in this study are available from the corresponding author upon any reasonable requests.
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Nat Commun 11, Download citation. Received : 06 September Accepted : 08 April Published : 29 April Regional Environmental Change Energies By submitting a comment you agree to abide by our Terms and Community Guidelines. If you find something abusive or that does not comply with our terms or guidelines please flag it as inappropriate. Advanced search. Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.
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